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Institutional variables are the most important factor explaining real convergence. But 
what are institutions? This paper examines the relationship between institutions and policies, 
institutions and organisations, and formal and informal institutions. The concept of propelling 
and stabilizing institutions is introduced and used to explain differences in real convergence. 
Finally, issues of institutional changes are analysed based on an analytical framework  which 
consists of initial conditions and two types of forces: collectivist and liberal. 
I first briefly present some basic facts about economic convergence and divergence 
over the last 200 years. I then discuss how the problem of long-run growth has been treated 
in the economic literature. Section 3 attempts to classify the concept of institutions – the key 
explanatory variable in the deeper analysis of the relative pace of development. In Section 4 I 
describe  two  types  of  institutions,  propelling  and  stabilizing,  and  their  relationship  to 
economic growth. Based on previous sections and the empirical literature on convergence, I 
then  formulate  some  broad  propositions  concerning  why  countries  converge  or  diverge 
(Section 5). The explanation runs in terms of institutional variables. In Section 6 I go one 
level deeper and ask what explains institutional change
1. 
 
                                                 
1 The first two sections are largely and Section 5 is party based on my contribution to L. Balcerowicz and S. 
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1. Economic Convergence and Divergence 
 
1. It is believed that prior to 1800 living standards differed little across countries and 
time (Parente and Prescott 2000, p. 23). Modern economic growth started around 
1800 in Western Europe (and its ethnic offshoots), bringing about an unprecedented 
acceleration in the growth of living standards in Western countries the per-capita GDP 
of which grew about eight times as fast between 1820 and 1989 as it had during in 
the precapitalist epoch (A. Maddison, 1991, p. 48). Such acceleration did not take 
place in other countries until about 1950. Thus, ‘‘the big story over the last 200–300 
years is one of the massive divergence in the levels of income per capita between the 
rich and the poor’’ (Easterly and Levine 2000, p. 18). 
 
2. As is well known from the work of Kuznets, Solow and others, productivity increase 
plays  the  most  important  role  in  countries  at  the  technology  frontier.  Factor 
accumulation can also play a substantial role in countries that are converging toward 
the technology frontier, as can the reallocation of labor from agriculture to the modern 
sector. 
 
3. While the Western countries as a group surged ahead, there was a substantial 
convergence of income levels in the West itself. The most widespread and intense 
convergence  occurred from  1950  to  1973,  when  all  the Western  economies  grew 
considerably faster than the United States (which grew at 2.2 percent). The fastest 
growth per capita was achieved by Japan (8 percent), Italy (5 percent), Germany, 
Austria  (4.9  percent),  and  France  (4  percent)  (Maddison  1991).  Spain  surged 
aheadfrom 1961 to 1975 with a growth rate of 6.9 percent. A true growth miracle 
happened during the 1990s in Ireland. 
 
4. The post–World War II period brought about an accelerated convergence among 
Western  countries  and  an  impressive  catching-up  of  some  other  economies—
particularly in Japan and among the East Asian tigers. Taiwan, Thailand, Singapore, 
South Korea, Malaysia, Hong Kong and China entered the race in the late 1970s and 
increased their per-capita income from 6.7 percent of the Western European average 
in 1976 to 17.9 percent in 2001. A slower but still impressive catching-up has been 
achieved more recently by India. Outside Asia, Chile has been a growth leader over 
the past 15 years. 
 Studies & Analyses CASE No. 342 – Institutions and Convergence (preliminary version) 
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5. There were also important examples of divergence during this period, most notably 
in  Africa  and  to  a  lesser  extent  in  Latin  America,  as  well  as  among  the  former 
Communist economies. From 1970 to 1998, per capita income fell in 32 countries, 
while only seven developing countries showed rapid convergence. However, China 
and India are among the seven fast-growing countries. As a result, 70 percent of the 
population of the developing world lives in countries where per capita income growth 
has exceeded that in the developed economies, while less than 10 percent lives in 




2. A Problem of Convergence and Divergence in the Economic 
Literature 
 
  Both the emphasis on and the approach to growth in the economic literature has 
varied over time. It was the main topic for Adam Smith and his followers and successors. The 
marginalist revolution in the late 19
th century shifted economists’ attention to the issues of 
market  exchange  and  allocation  under given  resources -  technology  and  the  consumers’ 
tastes. This static tradition was taken up and developed in general-equilibrium theory. Nor 
did monetary and macroeconomic analysis focus on long-run growth until after World War II. 
  Schumpeter (1913), one of the few to break away from the dominant static analysis of 
his time, has been retrospectively identified as a pioneer in the modern analysis of both 
growth  and  development.  He  focused  on  major  technological  breakthroughs  and  on  the 
related role of the entrepreneur (defined as a persons implementing inventions in business 
practice).  However,  his  views  on  what  type  of  institutional  framework  is  conducive  to 
technical change were rather ambivalent. 
  Issues of risk-taking and technical change also surfaced in the debate over whether 
socialism can be as economically efficient as capitalism. Lange (1936) argued that the first-
order conditions for a static optimum could be implemented as well by a planner as in a 
market system. Critics, notably Mises (1951) and Hayek (1935, 1949), emphasized issues of 
uncertainty  and  change  and  the  need  for  incentives.  Subsequent  experience  awards  the 
victory in the debate to the latter group
2. 
                                                 
2  For  an  analysis  of  his  debate  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  experience  of  real  socialism  see 
Balcerowicz (1995). Studies & Analyses CASE No. 342 – Institutions and Convergence (preliminary version) 
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  Starting after World War II, the economic profession and multinational organizations 
had to address the problem of underdevelopment in poorer countries, now named the less 
developed countries (LDCs). Among the pioneers in this literature were Albert Hirschman, 
Arthur Lewis, Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, and Walt Rostow. 
   Two basic approaches to the study of longer-term growth can be distinguished. The 
first  limits  its  attention  to  such  variables  as  land,  labor,  capital,  and  productivity,  which 
constitute  the  proximate  causes  of  growth.  The  institutional  framework  of  the  economy, 
which underlies these factors, is typically taken as given - i.e., it is not analyzed as a variable 
explaining the variation of the long-term growth rates. Within this literature, early models by 
Harrod  and  Domar  were  the  precursors  of  two  generations  of  growth  models,  those 
originating  from  Solow  (1956)  and  the  ever-growing  endogenous-growth  theory  approach 
starting from Lucas (1988) and Romer (1986). Barro pioneered cross-country econometric 
research on the determinants of longer-term growth. 
  The second approach omits or goes beyond the proximate causes and includes more 
deeply rooted factors of a more qualitative nature, most often institutional. 
  So long as growth theory and empirical work remains within the first framework, it is 
guaranteed to omit variables that are clearly crucial for growth (for example, whether an 
economy is socialist or capitalist, as in the cases of North and South Korea or East and West 
Germany)
3. It is possible to include measures of institutional variables (such as the extent of 
democracy and the monetary and fiscal frameworks) in empirical work, which has thus begun 
to bridge between the two approaches. 
  Within the second approach, one can distinguish two main and conflicting economic 
directions, free market and statist.  
  The  free-market  direction  is  rightly  associated  with  Adam  Smith  and  classical 
economics. Smith confronted the system of “perfect liberty” with that of the state-controlled 
protectionist economy, and linked economic freedom to the extent of the market and that to 
the division of labor (which was his name for technical change, Blaug, 1996) and division of 
labor to wealth. He stressed the positive role of market competition - a product of economic 
freedom - and was very critical of monopoly. He emphasized the ‘‘unproductive’’ nature of 
the  public  sector  and  was  skeptical  of  public  regulation  of  the  economy
4.  Smith’s  basic 
insights were maintained by his classical followers and successors. According to J. S. Mill 
                                                 
3 For example, in his overview of the recent developments in growth theory says, J. Temple (1999): “few of the 
variables  considered  here  would  offer  much  weight  into  the  experience  of  China  or  the  former  command 
economies, for example” (p. 141). N. Kaldor (1961), one of the pioneers of the growth models, emphasized that a 
“genuine” theory of economic growth will require drawing upon “sociological” factors to a much larger extent than 
is so far the case in economic theory.  
4 “No regulation of commerce can increase the quantity of industry in any society beyond what its capital can 
maintain. It can only divert a part of it into direction which it is by no means certain that this artificial direction is 
likely to be more advantageous to the society than that into which it would have gone on its own accord” (A. 
Smith, p. 79, quoted after A. Skinner). Studies & Analyses CASE No. 342 – Institutions and Convergence (preliminary version) 
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the state’s despotism - including predatory or arbitrary taxation - is much more dangerous to 
a nation’s progress than almost any degree of lawlessness and disturbance in the ‘‘system of 
freedom.’’. he prescribed strict limits to public intervention, emphasized the tendencies of 
governments, including democratic ones, to expand, and warned that active and benevolent 
governments would stifle individuals’ initiative and that government’s officials do not have 
proper incentives to direct business enterprises (J.S. Mill, 1909). 
  The  statist  direction  regards  the  free  market  and  the  related  limited  state  as 
fundamental obstacles to economic development and consequently recommends the state’s 
expansion as the key to growth. This tradition included the mercantilists, so much criticized 
by Adam Smith, but found its most vocal and somewhat paradoxical exponent in Karl Marx. 
While praising the technological dynamism of capitalism, he predicted its demise, pointing 
out (among other things) the allegedly destructive role of the ‘‘anarchy of production’’—that 
is,  of  market  competition.  Marx’s  central  message  was  implemented  in  the  form  of  the 
planned or command economy. North (1998, pp. 100–101) notes that ‘‘it is an extraordinary 
irony that Karl Marx, who first pointed out the necessity for restructuring societies to realize 
the potential of new technology, should have been responsible for creating economies that 
have foundered on these precise issues.” 
  Schumpeter’s writings display a similar, if not so visible, tension. In his early “Theory 
of Economic Development” (1912) he stresses the role of revolutionary technical change in 
capitalist development and links it to the activity of entrepreneurs. However, he claims that 
some of the motives of these drama personae may be present in non-capitalist systems and 
that capitalist profit motive can be replaced (p. 151). He goes much further in his “Socialism, 
Capitalism and Democracy” (first edition 1942). Here he positions himself firmly on the side 
of the proponents of the efficiency of socialism against L. von Mises and F.A. Hayek and 
alleges  that  industrial  managers  under  socialism  would  be  instructed  to  produce  as 
economically as possible and as a result ‘‘in the socialist order every improvement would 
theoretically  spread  by  decree  and  substandard  practice  could  be  promptly  eliminated’’       
(p. 196). 
  Reflecting the view that Soviet growth in the prewar period and the Great Depression 
showed  the  superiority  of  extensive  state  intervention,  the  early  post–World  War  II 
development economists postulated that a free market in the LDCs cannot be relied on to 
produce  growth  and  that  the  state  can  successfully  generate  a  take-off  by  concentrated 
investments, protectionism, and forced industrialization at the cost of agriculture
5. 
                                                 
5 For more analysis of the old development economics see: P. Bauer, K. Brunner, D. Lal, A.R. Waters, Ch. K. 
Rowley, and D. Bandow in J. Dorn, et al (1998). See also A. O. Krueger (1990). On the use or rather misuse of 
the growth models in policy advice to the LDC’s see W. Easterly (2002). Studies & Analyses CASE No. 342 – Institutions and Convergence (preliminary version) 
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  The failure of state-led development, including the crisis and breakdown of Soviet 
socialism, has demonstrated the bankruptcy of the statist approach and contributed to the 
revival of a free-market orientation in economics. This shift was helped by the increased 
focus on institutions and institutional variables, among them property rights (A. Alchian 1977, 
E. Furubotn, S. Pejovich 1974), public-choice theory (J. Buchanan 1989, G. Tullock 1998, W. 
Niskanen  1971),  constitutional  economics  (Hayek  1960,  Buchanan  1989),  interest-group 
theory (Olson 1965, Becker 1984), and economic history (North 1998). Empirical research 
linked economic growth to the development of the market-oriented financial sector (T. Beck, 
R.Levine,  and  N.  Loayza  1999;  R.  G.  Rajan  and  L.  Zingales  2001)  and  to  economic 
imbalances and inflation-products of unconstrained governments (S. Fischer 1991). Various 
indexes of economic freedom were developed after 1980, and a strong link between the 
extent of that freedom and economic growth was shown (Scully 1992; Hanke and Walters 
1997). 
  Summing up: developments in economics during the last twenty to thirty years have 
increased  the  importance  of  the  problem  of  economic  growth,  rehabilitated  the  role  of 
institutional variables, and shifted attention to the classical issues of economic freedom, the 
market, and the limits of government. This transformation is far from finished. Few today, 
however, would object to North’s assertion that, ‘‘the central issue of economic history and of 
economic development is to account for the evolution of political and economic institutions 
that create an economic environment that induces increasing productivity” (1991, p. 98). 
 
 
3. Institutions: some clarifications 
 
  According to North, ‘‘Institutions are the rules of the game in society; more formally, 
they are the humanly-devised constraints that shape human interaction. Thus, they structure 
incentives in exchange, whether political, social or economic’’ (1998, p. 95). 
  This definition may serve as a point of departure but requires some clarifications, so 
as to establish what set of factors which may affect outcomes is included under “institutions”. 
Obviously, the larger this set, the stronger the impact of “institutions”. Some differences in 
the  views  on  the  strength  of  this  impact  arise  from  conceptual  confusion  (i.e.,  grouping 
unequally large sets of variables under the same term of “institutions”). 
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  The conceptual classification should refer to the following relationships: 
1.  institutions versus policies, 
2.  institutions versus organizations, 
3.  formal and informal institutions. 
 
  Some authors regard the extent of economic freedom as a fundamental institutional 
variable while other authors classify, say trade liberalization as a “policy”. As a result the 
second group may ascribe more explanatory power to “policies” and less to “institutions” than 
the first group. In order to avoid such confusion one should classify the conceptual domains 
of  “institutions”  and  “policies”,  and  then  the  casual  relationships  between  the  variables 
designated by these terms. 
  “Policies” denote actions taken by certain actors. If our unit of analysis is a country, 
we usually speak of public (state) policies. Such policies can be usefully divided into: 
1.  reforms or institutional (structural) policies,  
2.  macroeconomic policies. 
  By definition, policies of the first type result in a change in a country’s institutional 
system (framework), which consists of all the institutions influencing individual’s behavior in a 
given country. Policies of the second type do not operate through institutions but through 
their impact on the economic variables, such as interest rates or aggregate demand. 
  Correspondingly, effects of reform policies should be ascribed both to policies and to 
institutions. However, the institutional framework does not only depend on top-down reforms 
(or the lack of them) but may change due to bottom-up institutional change (e.g., various 
forms of self-regulation or spontaneously evolved, new forms of contracts). The proportion 
between top-down and bottom-up reforms depends on a basic feature of the institutional 
system:  centralization  of  decisions  regarding  interpersonal  interactions  or  -  conversely  - 
freedom  of  interpersonal  interactions.  It  includes  freedom  of  setting  up  and  shaping  of 
various organizations for both economic and non-economic purposes, as well as freedom of 
contracts. 
  Turning to macroeconomic policies, let me point out that they depend on the existing 
institutional  framework:  that  is,  on  the  extent  of  the  independence  of  the  central  bank, 
institutional fiscal constraints (if any), and the proportion of mandatory budgetary spending. 
  Both  institutional  and  macroeconomic  policies  depend  not  only  on  the  inherited 
institutional  framework  but  also  on  non-institutional  factors,  which  include  the  personality 
features of the top decision-makers. Obviously, the weaker the institutional constraints on 
these individuals, the larger the potential impact of the personality variables. They matter 
more in the case of absolute than constitutional monarchs. However, even the best absolute Studies & Analyses CASE No. 342 – Institutions and Convergence (preliminary version) 
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ruler cannot overcome the basic weakness of absolutism as an institutional state; that is, the 
impossibility to make credible commitments (North and Weingast, 1989). Therefore, there is 
limited  substitution  between  personal  factors  and  institutional  reforms.  It  is  also  limited 
because personal factors in the case of absolute rulers are hardly a control variable; they are 
rather subject to chance variation. 
  Finally, let me point out that the role of an individual may consist in changing the 
inherited institutional system in a statist or liberal direction. 
  D.  North  has  sharply  separated  the  concept  of  “institutions”  from  that  of 
“organizations”.  However,  in  his  recent  work  with  B.  Weingast  (2006),  he  stresses  the 
fundamental role of organizations in development. I personally don’t find it useful to keep 
organizations  outside  the  analysis  of  institutions,  as  some  institutions  (in  North’s  original 
sense) shape the organizational set up of the society. It is better to distinguish between: 
1.  primary institutions, and 
2.  secondary institutions. 
 
  Primary institutions determine the shape of secondary institutions. This is not a full 
determination as various no-institutional factors influence what use is made of given primary 
institutions.  The  basic  primary  institutional  variable  is  –  already  mentioned  –  freedom  of 
interpersonal interactions. It shapes two secondary institutional variables: 
￿  the variety and type of organizations acting in society 
￿  the  mode  of  coordination  of  economic  actions  of  various  individuals  and 
organizations, i.e. whether it is of market or non-market type, and – within market 
type – the intensity of market competition. 
 
  Finally,  institutions  are  often  divided  into  formal  and  informal.  Both  types  perform 
similar functions in a society (dispute, resolution, contract enforcement, crime prevention and 
punishment, etc.), but differ in that formal institutions are somehow related to a state as an 
ultimate and specialized enforcer,
6 while informal institutions do not need the state but rely 
on shared beliefs regarding proper or prohibited behavior, and on informal social sanctions 
(e.g. exclusion, disapproval), as an enforcement mechanism (see e.g. Elster, 1989). Each 
society has some social norms and the related interpersonal networks. Societies differ in that 
some have only such informal institutions (“traditional” or “primitive” societies) while others 
have both formal and informal institutions. The existence of some formal institutions appears 
to be regarded as one of distinguishing features of a “civilization”. 
                                                 
6 I leave aside here the difficult question, “what is the state,” and how to distinguish some states from a mafia. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 342 – Institutions and Convergence (preliminary version) 
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  I think it is analytically useful to define institutions broadly, i.e. to include under this 
heading both formal and informal institutions. For: 
1.  it facilitates the comparison of the efficiency of informal and formal institutions; and – 
thus – the comparison of traditional and non-traditional societies; 
2.  it  highlights  the  problem  of  the  dynamic  interactions  between  informal  and  formal 
institutions (see “Building institutions…”, 2002).  
 
  One issue here is how  different informal institutions (cultures) interact with similar 
formal  systems,  e.g.  to  what  extent  differences  in  outcomes  under  centrally  planned 
economies in Soviet Asia and Europe were due to different informal institutions. This issue 
also includes the question of whether differences in religious beliefs influence outcomes of 
capitalistic systems.  
  Another  aspect  is  whether  and  how  a  given  formal  system  shapes  certain  social 
norms.  For  example,  initiatives  related  to  central  planning  encouraged  cheating,  e.g. 
manipulating superiors to get a plan that would be easy to (over)fulfill. One wonders whether 
a competitive market economy puts a premium on business honesty and thus strengthens 
the appropriate social norms. 
  Having  emphasized  the  importance  of  considering  both  informal  and  formal 
institutions, let me stress that the latter are a much more powerful determinant of economic 
performance than the former. This is being shown by huge differences in outcomes achieved 
by  culturally  similar  societies  subjected  to  very  different  formal  systems  (e.g.  North,  and 
South Korea, East and West Germany, the Czech Republic and Austria). They are surely 
much larger than differences in outcomes achieved by culturally different societies which 
started from the same level of economic development and were then subjected to similar 
formal systems. 
  Also,  cultures  are  not  so  different  that  under  any  pair  of  countries,  say  A  and  B, 
country  A  would  achieve  the  best  outcome  under  a  formal  system,  which  would  be  the 
opposite  from  that  of  country  B.  To  put  it  more  simply,  under  any  cultural  conditions  a 
command economy performs worse than a competitive market economy. This is because, 
besides  cultural  variety,  human  beings  have  certain  cognitive  and  motivational  invariants 
(human nature), which prevent a command economy from being superior to a market one. 
  Finally, informal institutions that are detrimental to the efficient operation of a market 
economy are likely to be even more detrimental to the efficiency of a planned economy. 
Take ethnolinguistic fragmentation. It is thought to limit the extent of market exchange across 
ethnolinguistic lines (“Building Institutions, 2002). However, under a command economy the Studies & Analyses CASE No. 342 – Institutions and Convergence (preliminary version) 
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same fragmentation would endanger serious conflicts regarding the centralized distribution of 
resources, and the related additional inefficiency. 
 
 
4. Propelling and Stabilizing Institutions 
 
  Growth trajectories differ enormously in the extent of their variability (OECD, 2000; W. 
Easterly and R. Levine, 2000; V. Hnatkovska  and N. Loayza, 2003). Some countries grow 
steadily,  albeit  at  different  pace,  while  others  are  plagued  by  serious  development 
breakdowns. These differences are partly due to differences in the external shocks that hit 
economies. However, many negative shocks are produced at home and countries differ in 
their ability to cope with external shocks. Finally, the very vulnerability to such shocks, due – 
for example – to the composition of domestic output, is an important variable which merits 
some explanation. 
  Sudden slowdowns, even if followed by rapid spurts of growth, may lower the average 
long term rate below that which is achievable under steadier growth. Indeed, a recent study 
(“Economic Growth in the 1990”, World Bank, 2005) found that the 18 most successful LDC’s 
“show remarkably narrow fluctuations in their growth rates over time” (p. 82)
7. Preventing 
serious growth breakdowns belongs, therefore, to growth strategy. 
   
    Against this background I propose to distinguish two kinds of institutional variables, or 
sets of institutions within a country’s (or region’s) institutional system:  
1.  Propelling institutions; 
2.  Stabilizing institutions. 
  By definition, propelling institutions determine the strength of the systematic forces of 
growth, while stabilizing institutions influence mainly the frequency and severity of domestic 
shocks and the capacity of the economy to deal with external shocks. 
  A country’s growth trajectory depends on the strengths of its propelling and stabilizing 
institutions.  When  both  are  strong,  growth  is  fast  and  relatively  smooth  (say  the  United 
States). When both are weak, growth is slow and interrupted by serious breakdowns (e.g., in 
some countries of Africa and Latin America). In the intermediate case propelling institutions 
are strong but stabilizing institutions are weak (e.g., South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia 
                                                 
7 These were countries that met two criteria: 1) their rate of per capita income growth exceeded that of the United 
States (7.7 percent a year) during the 1990’s, and 2) the same rate in the 1980’s was at least one percent a year 
(p. 79). Studies & Analyses CASE No. 342 – Institutions and Convergence (preliminary version) 
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before the 1998 crisis), or the propelling institutions are weak and the stabilizing institutions 
strong (like Portugal under Salzar until the economic liberalization in the 1960’s). 
 
  Propelling  institutions  may  be  conceptualized  through  two  –  partly  overlapping  – 
institutional variables: 
1.  The extent of economic freedom, 
2.  The fiscal position of a state (or community in the case of societies that have only 
informal institutions) 
Both variables determine the potential scope of and the relative incentives regarding 
productive (or developmental) actions, such as: work, innovation, saving, investment, and 
education. 
  The  extent  of  economic  freedom  is  an  important  component  of  a  more  general 
variable: freedom of interpersonal interactions. Economic freedom can, in turn, be expressed 
through the concept of property rights. 
  Let us start with elementary property rights, which – by definition – enter the concept 
of a property rights regime in the sense that these regimes may allow one or more type of 
elementary property rights. 
  Elementary property rights (and property rights regimes) differ in two dimensions: 
the content (structure) and level of enforcement. 
Both  dimensions  have  an  important  impact  upon  the  strength  of  propelling  institutions.  
Regarding the content, the first division of property rights would be into: communal and non-
communal (individualized) rights. 
  Communal property rights create a common pool problem: “a resource gets overused 
because  too  many  agents  have  the  right  to  use  it”  (A.  Schleifer,  1995  and  the  quoted 
literature). Communal property rights are typically informal institutions, and a feature of many 
societies without a state. 
  Non-communal  property  rights  are  usually  formal  institutions,  and  include  various 
forms of private firms as well as public ones. Notice that the distinction between a private and 
public firm should be primarily based on who is the owner – that is, whether it is a public 
institution or not. The theory of ownership is largely the theory of owners, as different types of 
owners face different sets of incentives, and – as a result - tend to behave quite differently. 
The basic distinction is between public and non-public owners (for more on this theme see L. 
Balcerowicz, 1995). 
  Let  us  now  move  to  property  rights  regimes.  I  believe  that  the  most  important 
dimension  of  economic  freedom  and  –  consequently  –  of  propelling  institutions,  can  be 
captured by the following typology: Studies & Analyses CASE No. 342 – Institutions and Convergence (preliminary version) 
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1.  An open (or liberal) property rights regime, that allows for the choice of various forms 
of private and non-private (co-operative) enterprises; 
2.  A  closed  regime,  that  ensures  the  monopoly  of  one  form:  communal  (traditional 
societies), state-owned (Soviet socialism), or labor-managed (former Yugoslavia)
8; 
3.  A mixed regime, which preserves the monopoly of SOE’s in some sectors (e.g. oil in 
Mexico or copper in Chile). 
 
The  property  rights  regime  matters  because  it  shapes  the  ownership  structure  of the 
economy and the extent of market competition, the latter both through the contestability 
of markets and through the behavior of established firms. The open regime gives rise to a 
private economy because entrepreneurs tend to prefer private firms as they give them 
more control than the co-operative ones. The closed system perpetuates a traditional 
community or produces an economy dominated by socialist firms, and the mixed regime 
creates a mixed ownership structure. 
 
  There are some other institutional dimensions which may be expressed as changes 
(differences)  in  the  control  or  cash  flow  rights  belonging  to  the  respective  elementary 
property rights (enterprise forms). 
  One  such  dimension  is  the  government  regulation  that  limits  the  extent  of  these 
rights, usually involving safety reasons, the protection of the “weaker” side of a contract or 
the  prevention  of  fraud.  The  effects  of  creeping  regulation  are  often  referred  to  as  the 
“attenuation” of property rights. 
  Some regulations - like price controls and barriers to entry and imports - strongly limit 
market competition. They should be singled out as anticompetitive regulations, which lead to 
distorted market economics and – in the extreme – to a market economy without competition. 
Corporatist structures, which can be conceptualized as informal institutions tolerated or even 
supported by the state, can have similar effects. 
  Countries differ sharply in the extent of governmental regulations of various sectors 
and markets. The most pronounced differences among contemporary economies are present 
in the labor market and in the service sector - especially in retail trade, the financial sector 
and construction. These differences have a profound impact on the pace of technological 
change and on productivity growth as market or sector specific regulations limit the flexibility 
of supply and the pace of restructuring (see, Scarpetta et al, 2002). Large differences in the 
extent of regulations of the same sectors among countries with a similar per capita income 
produce  huge  cross-country  differences  in  their  productivity.  And  large  differences  in  the 
                                                 
8 Ostensibly labor manager firms Yugoslavia were subject to control from the party – that is, the state. Thus the 
control rights of the workers were seriously limited. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 342 – Institutions and Convergence (preliminary version) 
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extent  of  regulations  of  various  sectors  in  the  same  country  are  responsible  for  equally 
striking  productivity  differences  (W.  Lewis,  2004).  This  shows  the  power  of  institutional 
variables  and  suggests  that  a  given  country’s  institutional  system  may  include  various 
institutional subsystems that differ sharply in the extent of economic freedom. 
 
  Let  us  now  turn  to  the  second  dimension  of  property  rights:  their  enforcement. 
Informal property rights - these which are based on ties of kinship or ethnicity - have a limited 
scope  of  enforcement  and,  may  limit  the  spread  of  markets  across  larger  groups,  thus 
hampering economic growth (“Building Institutions for Markets”). Traditional societies would 
then  be  locked  in  to  a  stationary  economy  because  of:  1)  the  communal  nature  of  their 
property  rights  and/or  2)  the  limited  scope  of  the  market  due  to  the  deficiencies  in  the 
enforcement of property rights. 
  However,  even  if  an  efficient  third  party  enforcer  is  necessary  for  the  market 
transactions to spread and the economy to grow,  we should not draw hasty conclusions 
about an economically beneficial role for the state. For the structures called “states” vary 
enormously: from protective states (Brunner, 1998) to predatory (Olson, 1982) or failed ones. 
And  even  under  “protective”  states,  a  large  role  is  played  by  non-state  mechanisms  for 
dispute resolution (arbitration, mediation). Finally, even if traditional societies are likely to be 
condemned to a stationary economy, the worst case scenario under the state may be even 
worse:  a  predatory  state  crowding  out  the  informal  institutions  without  creating  efficient 
formal ones in their place. This appears to be the fate of some African countries. Systems 
consisting  only  of  informal  institutions  are  likely  to  display  much  less  variation  in  their 
economic performance than systems dominated by formal institutions. 
  If property rights have the right content (i.e. creating strong incentives for individuals 
to engage in productive actions), then the higher the level of their enforcement, the better it is 
for economic growth. However, the issue of enforcement goes beyond its average level and 
includes inequality of a state’s enforcement of property rights across various groups in a 
country. This latter point was argued by De Soto (2000) with reference to the enormous size 
of the informal sector in Latin American economies. Reforms which improve the enforcement 
of private property rights by reducing such inequalities or raising the overall efficiency of the 
legal apparatus can substantially contribute to economic growth. 
  However, one cannot expect such effects if improved enforcement is attempted under 
badly  structured  property  rights  that  is,  a  closed  property  rights  regime.  Such  attempts 
amount to a fight with the informal sector that is an enclave of a private economy under 
socialism. Therefore, the growth effects of increased enforcement of property rights depend 
on their content. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 342 – Institutions and Convergence (preliminary version) 
 
 
  18 
 
 
  The  second  component  of  propelling  institutions,  besides  various  dimensions  of 
property rights, is the fiscal position of the state. I define this variable by the relative size 
and composition of budgetary spending and taxes (usually expressed as a percentage of a 
country’s GDP). The third dimension – that of a fiscal balance and of public debt - related to 
stabilizing institutions. 
  Taxes can be conceived of as a reduction in economic freedom, so there is some 
overlap  between  property  rights  and  the fiscal  rate  of the  state.  Increased  taxes  tend  to 
reduce the benefits of effort. Besides some of them, like anticompetitive regulations, distort 
the way the effort is used. Thus, what matters for incentives and therefore for the strength of 
propelling  forces  is  not  only  the  tax/GDP  ratio,  but  also  the  structure  of  taxes  (see  W. 
Leibfritz,  I.  Thorton  and  A.  Bibee,  1997).  Countries  differ  in  both  of  these  dimensions 
considerably. However, it is not clear how large the differences in the incentive effects of 
various taxes are and – as a result – how much growth one can achieve via tax reforms 
compared to the reduction of the overall tax burden. This is an important topic for research. 
  Speaking about taxes one should remember that low effective official taxes can go 
hand in hand with large bribes. This is especially likely under a highly discretionary state with 
a  corrupt  administration.  The  fiscal  position  of  the  state  should  include  all  compulsory 
payments related to the existence of the state - that is, both official taxes and bribes. Only 
then can we have the full picture of the incentive effects of the state
9. What matters for an 
affected individual or a firm is, first of all, how much he/she has to pay and much less what 
form the forced payments have. 
  Increased budgetary spending is the only reason for increased tax burden and thus it 
is responsible for its negative effects. Practically all the enormous increase in the spending to 
GDP ratio (and consequently tax to GDP ratio) that happened during the last 100 years in the 
developed countries and among many of the less developed ones, has been due to the rise 
of  social  spending  (i.e.,  the  so-called  welfare  state).  There  is  a  strong  link  between  the 
structure of social transfers and their share in GDP: a high replacement ratio (rewarding non-
work), easy access to social benefits, and a large share of the public spending of health and 
pensions produce large welfare states. 
  Growing social transfers not only weaken propelling institutions by producing a large 
tax burden. In addition, they can discourage some productive actions in a direct way. Large 
“pay-as-you-go” (PAYG) systems, if credible, tend to reduce private savings and – as a result 
–  domestic  investment  (There  is  still  limited  substitution  between  foreign  and  domestic 
                                                 
9 The inclusion of only official taxes in the empirical research May lead to the underestimation of the importance of 
low taxes for growth. For countries with low official tax burden include those that are plagued by large required 
bribes and have large total forced payments and  - as a result – low growth. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 342 – Institutions and Convergence (preliminary version) 
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savings). This lowers both the capital outlays and via reduced embodied technical change – 
productivity growth. Many social benefits systems discourage work and thus reduce labor 
supply
10. 
  Finally, state-financed health and education-especially if linked with state monopolies 
on the supply side-is likely to produce large opportunity costs (i.e., innovations that would 
appear if the private sector were allowed to operate). 
  The destructive force of large social transfers in the underdeveloped economies has 
been shown in a spectacular way by two natural experiments: the introduction of the costly 
West German Social System in East Germany and increases,, U.S.-financed social transfers 
in Puerto Rico. 
 
  Since  Keynes,  the  economic  profession  has  focused  on  analyzing  the  self-
equilibrating properties of the macro-economy, taking the market structure of the economy as 
given. While there is much to be discussed in this regard, there is little doubt that the worst 
breakdowns in economic growth in the contemporary world have occurred under extended 
and not laissez-faire states, and because of the actions of the governments of former states. 
  In his seminal paper, S. Fisher (1993) has shown that macroeconomic policies that 
help  to  determine  the  rate  of  inflation,  the  budget  deficits,  and  the  balance  of  payments 
matter for long-term growth. And in a recent paper, V. Hnatkovska and N. Loayza (2003) 
investigated  79  countries  during  1960-2000  and  conclusioned  that “volatility  and  long-run 
growth are negatively related” and that “this negative link is exacerbated in countries that are 
poor,  institutionally  underdeveloped,  undergoing  intermediate  stages  of  financial 
development, or unable to conduct countercyclical fiscal policies”. They add that this link 
does  not  result  from  small  cyclical  deviations  but  from  “large  drops  below  output  trend”. 
Therefore  “it’s  the  volatility  due  to  crisis,  and  not  due  to  normal  times  that  harms  the 
economy’s long-run growth performance”. 
  Against this background it is legitimate to ask whether the propensity to crisis does 
not  depend  on  some  institutional  features  and  to  propose  the  concept  of  stabilizing 
institutions. 
  These institutions: 
1.  Determine the frequency and severity of the main types of crisis: monetary (high or 
sudden  inflations),  fiscal  (large  deficits  and  growing  public  debt,  GDP  ratio),  and 
banking (the collapse of systematically important banks). 
2.  Determine the vulnerability and response to external shocks. 
Correspondingly, one should look for stabilizing institutions to: 
                                                 
10 Under badly-administered welfare states many people Draw various social benefits and work In the informal 
economy. However, in this situation increased taxes are required too. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 342 – Institutions and Convergence (preliminary version) 
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￿  monetary regimes: to what extend they protect the stability of money, 
￿  fiscal regimes: whether they put any constraints upon budgetary spending, deficits 
and public debts, 
￿  banking regulation and supervision, 
￿  regulations and arrangements influencing the flexibility of prices. 
 
  There  is  some  overlap  between  the  propelling  and  stabilizing  institutions.  For 
example, ownership of banks matters both for their efficiency and for stability.  State-owned 
banks, inherently susceptible to political pressures and having worse corporate oversight, are 
prone  to  grant  more  bad  loans  than  private  banks  (see  “Finance  for  Growth”).  The 
institutional structure of the labor market influences both employment and the reaction of the 
economy to external shocks. 
  Also, some stabilizing institutions would not only influence the volatility of growth but 
also  the  strength  of  systemic  growth  forces.  Persistently  high  inflation,  a  sign  of 
macroeconomic  instability,  damages  in  many  ways  the  more  permanent  conditions  for 
economic development. 
  Finally, let us recall that stabilizing institutions do not fully determine macroeconomic 
policies, as there is usually the role of personality and chance factors. The scope of this role 
varies  depending  on  the  strength  of  institutional  constraints  upon  policymakers.  In  an 
extreme case rules would substitute for policymakers and then there would be no role for 
personality with their stabilizing or destabilizing potential
11. 
 
  It should be obvious that stronger propelling and stabilizing institutions imply stronger 
constraints upon policymakers (i.e., a limited state that presupposes some basics of the rule 
of law). In this sense economic institutions are at the same time political institutions. 
 
 
5. Some Propositions on Convergence 
 
  Based on the previous sections and on my reading of the empirical literature I will 
formulate  some  broad  propositions  with  respect  to  the  failures  and  successes  of 
convergence. 
  The main proximate force of convergence is borrowing and the adaptation of broadly-
defined  technologies,  stemming  from  more  advanced  economies.  Failure  to  converge 
                                                 
11 His is the essence of Milton Friedman’s famous monetary rule. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 342 – Institutions and Convergence (preliminary version) 
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happens when serious weaknesses of propelling institutions block this force and/or when 
serious weaknesses of stabilizing institutions produce profound disruptions. 
   
Here are the main institutional configurations that preclude convergence: 
 
1.  A  system  consisting  of  informal  institutions  with  communal  property  rights  and/or 
informal enforcement (traditional community). 
2.  Statist systems, i.e.:   
2.1. Systems with a closed  property rights regime (i.e., with a ban on the creation of 
private firms). The main example is Soviet socialism in which, in addition, central 
planning replaced co-ordination by the market. 
2.2. Systems with nominally liberal or mixed property rights regimes that have at least 
one of the following features: 
￿  A dominant state sector; 
￿  Very limited competition due to strong anticompetitive regulations on entry and/or 
on imports of goods, capital, and technology; 
￿  Other  very  restrictive  regulations  impacting  the  adoption  of  new  technologies, 
especially restrictive labor practices or a high level of job protection. 
￿  The protection of property rights is limited to a privileged minority, while a large 
part of the population operates in the informal sector. 
￿  Low overall protection of property rights. 
￿  A large welfare state in a poor country. 
￿  A profound weakness of stabilizing institutions, leading to chronic or frequent and 
profound macroeconomic imbalances. 
3.  Predatory or failed states; 
 
  Countries that are nowadays advanced owe this lucky situation to having had strong 
propelling and stabilizing institutions in the past. If they preserve this feature to a sufficient 
extent they would constitute a moving target for societies have institutional characteristics 
(1), (2), or (3). 
  Traditional  communities  fail  to  converge  because  of  improper  content  of  market 
transactions. Statist systems fail to converge because the state is so unconstrained that it 
damages propelling institutions. Another reason may be a state capture by a minority that 
benefits from economic rents by limiting the competition. Failed and predatory states fail to 
converge because they destroy propelling institutions as they produce no - or even negative-
protection of private property rights. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 342 – Institutions and Convergence (preliminary version) 
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  Failure to converge happens not only under each of these systems but also under 
transition from one of them to another one. We can speak here of unlucky transitions. To be 
more precise, I postulate that no lasting convergence is possible under transition: 
￿  From a traditional society to a statist or  failed (predatory) state; 
￿  From a statist system to a failed (predatory) state or vice versa; 
￿  From one type of statist system to another; 
 
  Let me now turn to the institutional conditions of successful (lasting) convergence. 
I believe that all the success cases of sustained convergence have happened: 
1.  Under more or less free market systems with relatively strong stabilizing institutions 
or 
2.  During and after the transition to such a system; 
 
The  market  systems  in  question  are  based  on  open  property  rights  regimes  that 
contribute to stronger market competition compared to any case of a failed convergence. 
There are only a few cases that would fall into the first category, as only a few countries 
including Hong Kong and (perhaps) the United States have preserved a more or less free 
market system during their whole existence.12  
  The second group of countries is much more numerous because most here have 
suffered  episodes  of  statism.  Their  initial  conditions  include  different  varieties  of  statist 
systems. The transition consists in strengthening propelling—and sometimes of stabilizing - 
institutions, and includes some or all of the following: 
￿  A shift from a closed to an open property rights regime; 
￿  Privatization of SOE; 
￿  Liberalization  (deregulation):  elimination  of  anticompetitive  regulations  and  other 
restrictions; 
￿  Building institutions supporting markets, including increased enforcement of property 
rights; 
￿  Introducing stability-oriented monetary or fiscal arrangements. 
 
  Much  more  empirical  research  is  needed  to  establish  what  packages  of  market 
reforms and what initial conditions are likely to bring about sustained convergence. Here I will 
mention two other issues.  
                                                 
12 Such countries needed to catch up because they emerged later than other economies. If they had been created 
earlier, they would not have needed to converge because they would grow the fastest from the very beginning 
thanks to their free market systems. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 342 – Institutions and Convergence (preliminary version) 
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  First,  one  should  distinguish  between  transition  effects  and  permanent  effects. 
Acceleration of growth does not have to wait until the completion of reforms (i.e., until “good” 
institutions”  have  been  achieved).  Rather,  growth  may  accelerate  during  the  reforms: 
improvements in the direction of a market system can increase growth. These can be called 
transition effects. The transition effects increase growth because they increase productivity in 
the previously repressed sectors (e.g. agriculture in China after Mao or retail trade in the 
Soviet  system)  or  because  the  previous  incentive  structure  encourages  massive  waste 
(command socialism). The larger the relative size of the repressed sectors and the deeper 
the  repression,  the  larger  the  magnitude  of  transition  effects.  For  example,  the  share  of 
repressed agriculture in China was much larger than in the Soviet bloc, and this explains to 
some extent the differences in the growth performance between the two regions during the 
early years of reform. 
  Transition effects tend to expire after a certain time and the rate of subsequent growth 
largely  depends  on  the  strengths  of  permanent  incentives  to  work,  save,  invent,  and 
innovate. 
  Second, some exceptionally rapidly-growing countries have been referred to as the 
growth miracles. Some have argued that a growth miracle can occur only in countries that 
started with a large development gap and especially a large technology gap relative to the 
leader. This is Gerschenkron’s (1962) advantage of backwardness (see also Madison, 1991 
and Parante and Prescott, 2000). However, Ireland shows that it is not necessary to begin far 
behind to start growing very fast over a number of years. One wonders whether the Irish 
case has broader policy implications. 
  What  explains  growth  miracles?  There  are  three  alternative  explanations  in  the 
economic literature: 
1.  Some  special  state  interventions,  like  directed  credits  and  state-led 
industrialization; 
2.   The combination of such interventions and an improved framework for private 
economic activity; 
3.  An improved framework for private economic activity alone, which was better than 
in other LDC’s. 
 
  A  closer  look  at  the  experience  of  growth  miracles  (e.g.,  Taiwan,  South  Korea, 
Malaysia,  Thailand,  Indonesia,  Hong  Kong,  Singapore,  and  Botswana)  suggests  that  the 
third explanation is most plausible. The argument is that while the miracle economies differed 
in the extent of special state interventions (e.g., none in Hong Kong but present in most other 
countries) they had one thing in common - a large dose of market reforms.  Combined with Studies & Analyses CASE No. 342 – Institutions and Convergence (preliminary version) 
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their  initial  conditions,  this  ensured  a  larger  extent  of  economic  freedom  (i.e.,  stronger 
propelling institutions than in other developing countries). This better framework included a 
limited fiscal position of the state: budgetary spending as a percentage of GDP among the 
“Asian Tigers” rarely surpassed 20 percent-compared to almost 40 percent in Brazil in the 
1990’s. 
  One lesson from the miracle countries, I believe, is that rapid catching-up requires 
keeping the welfare state at a minimum. This is not to say that people are then deprived of 
“social”  security,  as  the  rapid  growth  of  incomes  allows  for  the  development  of  private 
savings and commercial insurance, and a limited welfare state leaves space for the growth of 
a “welfare society” in the form of family networks and mutual aid associations. 
  Returning to the question of why special state interventions cannot explain the growth 
miracle, let me note that an analysis of such interventions in the miracle countries tended to 
obstruct rather than promote longer-term growth – as, for example, South Korea’s state – led 
heavy industrialization drive in the 1970’s (see Quibria, 2002). 
 
  While  all  the  successful  cases  of  sustained  convergence  have  taken  place  under 
more or less free market systems, or during and after the transition to such systems, not all 
market-oriented reforms have led to lasting convergence. 
  It is all too easy to find examples of market-oriented reforms that failed to produce 
lasting  convergence.  I would  distinguish  between  ostensible  and genuine failures.  Let  us 
start with the first group: 
1.  Reforms are frequently announced but not implemented or are implemented to a lesser 
extent than planned. 
2.  Reforms may be implemented initially, but then reversed or seriously attenuated. In 
both  cases,  critics  may  blame  the  announced  reforms,  rather  than  the  failure  to 
implement them, for the failure to converge. 
3.  Some authors acknowledge that it was the reversal of reforms and not the reforms 
themselves  that  caused  a  lack  of  convergence,  but  blame  the  reforms  and  the 
reformers for their rejection, linking them to social or political protests. Such critics tend 
to take it for granted that there existed some milder reforms which, if implemented, 
would have avoided the protests while producing the desired economic results. 
 
  There  are  nonetheless genuine  reasons  why  market  reforms may fail  to generate 
lasting convergence. Let me note three, which should be regarded as a hypothesis meriting 
future research: 
 Studies & Analyses CASE No. 342 – Institutions and Convergence (preliminary version) 
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1.  Market-oriented reforms may fail to produce convergence if they are incomplete in a 
critical way, in particular by violating crucial complementarities.  
One  example  would  be  introducing  a  fixed-exchange  regime  without  adequately 
strengthening the fiscal framework (as occurred in Argentina). Another is an external 
opening with very rigid markets and barriers to job creation that hamper the reallocation 
of labor from sectors exposed to competition. Yet another is the opening of the capital 
account  in  the  presence  of  an  insufficiently  strong  macro  framework  and  financial 
system.  
An important research and policy question is to discover which partial reform packages 
can be introduced successfully, and which are likely to fail. Quite likely, a package that 
does not leave any part of the economy in critically bad shape is more likely to generate 
convergence  than  a  package  –  even  a  very  ambitious  one  –  that  leaves  a  major 
weakness in a significant part of the economy. However, under certain initial conditions 
a rather large minimum scope (threshold) of reforms may be required if they are to be 
sustained and to produce convergence. This was, for example, the case of centrally 
planned economies (Balcerowicz, 1995). 
 
2.  Market-oriented  reforms  may  fail  to  generate  convergence  if  some  of  their  crucial 
details are badly structured and induce operational failures. Examples include a serious 
misspecification of the initial level of a fixed exchange rate peg, or a wrong incentive 
structure in the bankruptcy law. 
 
3.  Some  regions  may  be  of  such  an  inhospitable  nature  or  so  distant  –  in  terms  of 
transportation  costs  –  from  large  markets  that  no  profitable  economic  activity  can 
develop  there  (Gallup,  Sachs,  Mellinger,  1998).  In  such  situations  market-oriented 
reforms  cannot  produce  lasting  convergence.  However,  such  a  geographical 
predicament  at  the  country  level,  while  present  in  parts  of  Africa  and  on  other 
continents, is still relatively rare, as there are few countries with a sizeable population 
that consists only of inhospitable and distant regions. 
   
  The  remarks  so  far  have  focused  on  the  link  between  the  nature  of  a  country’s 
institutional system and convergence. One can go a level deeper and ask the question “What 
accounts for changes or differences in this system?” 
  Answering this question requires us to look at the political economy of institutional 
change. 
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6. Explaining the Institutional Change 
 
  A brief look at history gives us the following picture: 
 
￿  Western  countries  changed  their  institutional  systems  in  a  market-oriented  direction 
during the 19
th century; this has not happened in other countries, except for Japan
13. 
￿  The liberal change that occurred in the West during the 19
th century was rather gradual. 
In the early 20
th century, especially after the Great Depression, a change occurred in a 
statist  direction  (i.e.,  protectionism,  increased  regulations,  and  the  increased  fiscal 
position  of  the  state),  to  be  followed  by  a  wave  of  market  reforms.  Still,  different 
countries  displayed  various  time  patterns  of  institutional  change,  and  their  present 
systems differ substantially, in particular with respect to the size and structure of the 
welfare state and institutions affecting the supply of labor. 
￿  In most LDC’s the expansion of statism in the 20
th century was much more pronounced 
– witness Russia under the Bolsheviks and China under Mao. Statism also spread in 
Africa,  Latin  America  and  Asia.  Only  a  minority  of  countries  (the  so-called  “Asian 
Tigers”) moved in the market direction in the 1960’s and 1970’s.  They were followed 
later  by  China,  India,  some  countries  of  the  former  Soviet  bloc,  and  some  Latin 
American and African economies. Still statist systems (or failed states) survive in the 
Middle East and much of Africa (not to mention North Korea and Cuba), and some 
states  have  recently  started  to  move  toward  more  statism,  for  example  Venezuela 
under Chaver or Argentina under Kirschner. 
￿  The dynamics of institutional change differed. Some changes consisted of a gradual 
accumulation, while others included radical initial breakthroughs. This is true of both 
statist and liberal transformations. Examples of gradual statist change include Western 
countries  after  the  Second World War,  while  dramatic  statist  expansion  occurred  in 
Soviet  Russia  and  Maoist  China.  Gradual  market  reforms  prevailed  in  the Western 
countries during the last 30 years and in India; radical breakthroughs in the market 
direction happened in most CLE countries after the collapse of communism. 
￿  Some market reforms started under democratization of the political system, while other 
market reforms were implemented under inherited democracy (e.g., Western countries, 
India  during the  20
th  century),  still  others  under  non-democratic regimes  (e.g., most 
Asian tigers in the 1960’s and 1980’s, and China and Vietnam since 1980’s). 
                                                 
13 India does not appear to have been catching-up during the 19th century and it his raises the question of the 
impact of the British rule on the institutions of India. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 342 – Institutions and Convergence (preliminary version) 
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  I  don’t  think  any formal  theory  can  explain  in  detail  these  (and  other)  varieties  of 
institutional  change.  Even  less  likely  is  a  theory  that  would  predict  future  institutional 
developments;  history  is  largely  unpredictable,  full  of  chance  factors  and  unintended 
consequences. 
  What we can feasibly try to do is to develop an analytical scheme that would define 
the  main  variables  (mechanisms)  affecting  institutions.  It  is  up  to  the  various  empirical 
studies (cross-country or panel econometric investigations, historical research, case studies, 
pairwise comparisons, etc.) to give some content to these variables (mechanisms). 
  I believe that a simple scheme would include: 
1.  Initial conditions, which comprise the initial institutional system; 
2.  The types of countervailing forces: 
2.1. Collectivist (statist) forces, which act to preserve the inherited statist elements and 
create resistance to market reforms. 
2.2. Liberal (anti-statist) forces which act to preserve the inherited market elements (if 
any) and drive market reforms. 
 
  Both types of forces include domestic and external influences, which  interact with 
each other and with initial conditions. In a dynamic setting, early initial conditions interacting 
with  various  forces  produces  outcomes  that  constitute  the  next  initial  conditions  which 
interact…, etc. 
  I will now describe several distinct cases of institutional change: 
 
1.  From an analytical point of view the easiest case is that of an imposed institutional 
change that is introduced by an outside force. A Soviet-type system was imposed on 
Poland and other countries ultimately by the force of the Red Army, so the statist forces 
necessarily prevailed upon all countervailing factors, regardless of the differences in the 
initial conditions. What remains to be explained, of course, is why the Soviet system was 
introduced in Russia in the first place. 
Another example is the imposition of liberal constitutions in West Germany and Japan 
by the Western occupying forces. As distinct from the Soviet system, these constitutions 
were later voluntarily maintained. 
Imposed  systems  may  also  include  institutional  arrangements  introduced  by  the 
colonial powers in Africa, Latin America and a large part of Asia. The basic question here 
is - What were the differences in these early systems and how can one explain them? 
According  to  one  interesting  hypothesis,  a  large  proportion  of  settlers  brought  in  a Studies & Analyses CASE No. 342 – Institutions and Convergence (preliminary version) 
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political culture that embraced the limited state and - interacting with the abundance of 
land  -  produced  a  competitive  market  economy  and  limited  government.  This  large 
proportion  itself  is  explained  by  the  absence  of  tropical  diseases  (Acemoglu,  D.,  S. 
Johnson, and I. A. Robinson, 2001; Easterly, W. and R. Levine, 2002). It is also claimed 
that the differences in the initial systems persisted over centuries. This finding - derived 
from econometric studies - begs many questions and certainly does not prove a general 
point that early institutions always perpetuate themselves, and even less that the world is 
permeated with institutional determinism. We know from history that radical institutional 
change happens, and most often happens unexpectedly. 
 
2.  Take as a point of departure a country with a large extent of freedom (i.e., a competitive 
market  economy  and  limited  state).  This  produces  many  spontaneous  innovations 
which  ensure  the  adaptability  of  the  system  to  new  opportunities  and  threats  and 
relatively rapid economic growth. Therefore, a virtuous circle should operate as follows: 
good  initial  institutional  system  →  good  results  →  support  for  this  system  (strong 
proportion of liberal to statist forces) →good future system, etc. Are there any threats to 
this virtuous circle? History shows this is not a bullet-proof mechanism: statist forces can 
sometimes prevail over liberal ones and produce increased state intervention even in the 
initially freest society. 
 
  I have here to be more specific about the statist forces. I divide them into: 
￿  Situational (especially dramatic events); 
￿  Systematic (i.e., acting constantly even though with varying intensity). 
  Situational forces could be exemplified by the Great Depression or recent corporate 
scandals in the United States. These can be called political shocks. They interact with the 
systematic forces in producing messages (interpretations) that affect public opinion and – 
as a result – policies. 
  Systematic forces include: 
 
￿  Collectivist  doctrines  (e.g.,  Marxism;  crude  Keynesism  with  its  belief  in  fiscal 
stimulation as a panacea for all economic ills and its distrust of private investment as 
a destabilizing force; old fashioned welfare state economics and a related misuse of 
its concepts of externalities, public goods and market failures as justification for state 
intervention); 
￿  Widespread  collectivist  clichés,  partly  fuelled  by  the  collectivist  doctrines  (e.g., 
disregarding the link between spending and taxes (believing in free lunch, perceiving Studies & Analyses CASE No. 342 – Institutions and Convergence (preliminary version) 
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the market transactions especially in the labor market as an exploitation of the weak 
by the strong, statism as a part of national identity, the lump sum fallacy of labor and 
many, many others); 
￿  Statist  interests  (collectivist  clichés  are  genuinely  believed  and  mixed  up  with 
powerful emotions, which interest groups manipulate to their advantage emotions. 
Some politicians are power-hungry therefore inclined to support the extension of state 
power.    Some  businessmen  seek  protection  against  competition,  and  there  is  a 
demand for social transfers, etc. Interest groups use political system or create new 
legal  arrangements  within  the  overall  legal  framework,  allowing  a  broad  flexibility 
(e.g., poison pills and other defenses against hostile takeovers). 
 
The moral from the above is that even the best institutional system - i.e., the one most 
favorable for long-run economic growth - is in danger of some doses of statism. To 
reduce this danger liberal forces in society have to be well organized and – nowadays 
– capable of winning the constant battle of mass communication. Good economics 
does not win by itself. 
 
3.  Forces of statism may sometimes prevail in a free society, as shown by the experience 
of the Western countries between the Great Depression and the turn of the 1970’s and 
1980’s. This experience has produced an institutional system with a sharply-increased 
fiscal role of the state due to expansion of the social transfers and with visibly-increased 
regulations. We may call this a constrained market economy. However, during the 1970’s 
and  1980’s  a  wave  of  market  reforms  followed.  To  be  sure,  they  are  largely  not 
completed and countries differ in the time pattern of their liberal transitions and in the 
results achieved so far. Still, the economies of the West are now much less regulated (O. 
Blanchard, 2004); the change in the fiscal position of the state has been generally much 
less  pronounced.  Some  countries  have  strengthened  their  institutional  stability  by 
increasing  the  independence  of  their  central  banks  (e.g.,  Britain  and  Sweden)  or  by 
introducing stability-oriented fiscal frameworks (e.g., Sweden and Denmark). 
  The  wave  of  market  reforms  may  be  explained  –  to  some  extent  –  by  the  bad 
consequences  of  the  constrained  market  economy.  They  were  aggrevated  by  the 
economic shocks of the 1970’s, which also discredited Keynesian demand policies in the 
economic profession. All these must have weakened the relative strength of the statist 
forces. 
  If  increased statism  in a free  society  is  always  possible  but tends  to be  reversed 
because  of  its  own  economic  consequences,  then  perhaps  free  societies  have  a Studies & Analyses CASE No. 342 – Institutions and Convergence (preliminary version) 
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propensity  to  “institutional  cycles”  influencing  their  long-run  economic  cycles.  Do 
successful market reforms become socially entrenched because of their good economic 
results?  Or is the opposite true: Do good economic results – by lessening the economic 
pressure – allow more scope for statism (e.g., expansion of the welfare state)?14 Why 
has the retrenchment of the fiscal size of the state so far been much more modest than 
the progress on deregulation? Why is the relative position of statist forces in the first 
proposition stronger so far than of the second one? Is it because the expansion of the 
welfare state – at least in some countries – has produced some statist “equilibriums” 
(e.g., large costs of transition to funded pension systems due to a previously expanded 
PAYG system and the number of non-beneficiaries of social transfers exceeding that of 
not payers)? 
  These and other questions require further research. 
 
4.  Take as an initial position an extremely statist system – like communism, which used to 
exist in the Soviet bloc and still exists in Cuba and North Korea. This system produces 
very bad economic results and in relative performance worsens over time. Naïve thinking 
would suggest that bad economic results – a deepening crisis - should weaken the statist 
forces and lead to market reforms, so self-correction would operate. However, the Soviet 
Union existed for over 70 years, Maoism in China for 30 years, and communism in Cuba 
and  North  Korea  still  survives  -  all  with  disastrous  results.  Clearly,  the  self-correction 
mechanism  under  extreme  statism,  if  it  operates,  takes  quite  a  long  time.  And  it  is 
impossible to predict when exactly a totalitarian system will break down from within, or 
reform (like in China). 
  The simple reason for the fact that bad economic results produced by totalitarianism 
are  not  rapidly  translated  into  strong  pressure  for  market  reforms  is  that  this  very 
totalitarianism  keeps  the  population  under  harsh  control.  Therefore,  the  change  must 
come either from outside or from within the black box of the entrenched elites15. The 
latter can take quite a lot of time, perhaps because rulers are shielded from the economic 
consequences of the system they run and because they are isolated from the external 
world. 
                                                 
14  One  example  may  be  Britain,  which  suffered  a  deep  relative  decline  due  to  statist  policies,  then  had 
fundamental market reforms under Ms. Thatcher.  These reforms largely improved the performance of the British 
economy, to be followed by the expansion of the fiscal position of the state under New Labor. 
 
15 The solidarity movement may appear to be and – to some extent was – an exception. One should remember, 
however,  that:  1)  Solidarity  was  suppressed  in  December  1981;  2).  The  Polish  system  was  not  a  typical 
totalitarian system; and 3) later developments in Poland interacted with a change within the Soviet elite – the 
“Gorbachev factor.” Studies & Analyses CASE No. 342 – Institutions and Convergence (preliminary version) 
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  This is not to say that extreme statism is not subject to long-term pressures. One 
such pressure is due to the technological superiority of the market system, which can be 
translated into a military threat (the Reagan factor during the Gorbachev years or the 
American black ships on the coasts of Japan before the Meiji reforms). 
  A breakdown of extreme statism is not only difficult to predict, it is also difficult to 
explain in terms of “winners” and “losers” of change (for a similar point see: Lal, 2006). 
For such a breakdown involves a lot of confusion, uncertainties and chance factors.  Most 
people cannot define their absolute and relative positions in the future system, which 
nobody can clearly describe. One can only say that the breakthrough would not have 
happened  if  a  large  part  of  the  elite  strongly  believed  that  they  would  suffer  under 
whatever new system was emerging. If they had such strong beliefs they would most 
likely stop the change. 
 
5.  Radical liberating breakthroughs happen and usually happen unexpectedly. The recent, 
and enormously important, example is the collapse of Soviet communism. It opened the 
way for fundamental institutional change. Massive research shows that part-communist 
economies have differed widely in their growth record sp far, and that these differences 
are strongly related to the extend of accumulated market reforms (see Aslund, 2002): 
countries that amassed more reforms tend to perform better than those that amassed 
less reforms. Countries that catch up with growth as well. What explains the differences 
in the extent of market reforms? Why has the balance of statist and liberal forces been so 
different across countries, and – to some extent – across time in the same countries? 
This is another area for more empirical research.  Here I can only make some tentative 
points
16: 
￿  Countries differed in what I call reform linkages. In some countries market reforms 
were linked – objectively and in the public’s perception – to some important non-
economic goals, like entering the EU or preserving independence (e.g., the Baltics). 
Other countries did not have such positive conditionalities strengthening the liberal 
forces.  And  in  Russia  market reforms following the  collapse  of  USSR  might  have 
been linked to the loss of empire, so a negative linkage might have operated. It is an 
empirical question to what extent the IMF and World bank conditionalities might have 
substituted for the EU conditionality. 
￿  Countries may differ in the popularity of collectivist doctrines and clichés among their 
citizens. And mass media may differ in the extent of its use of populist techniques. 
                                                 
16 Some of them may apply to non-post communist countries. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 342 – Institutions and Convergence (preliminary version) 
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￿  Political shocks, which create opportunities for statist political forces, were surely not 
identical across countries. 
￿  Pro-reform political forces, when in power, are inclined to pursue reforms even during 
a good economic situation, while statist political forces that inherit the same situation 
are likely to delay market reforms or even revert to statism. They can safely do that 
for a certain time because financial markets are not an early warning system.  Other 
external  warning  mechanisms  (e.g.,  rating  agencies  and  international  financial 
institutions)  operate  more  strongly  only  when  the  economic  situation  has  already 
gotten worse. During a bad economic situation - especially an acute crisis - both pro- 
and  antireform  forces  are  likely  to  reform,  the  former  both  due  to  conviction  and 
necessity, the latter only because of necessity. 
 
Now, countries surely differed in their economic-political trajectory: some countries 
probably had more instances when a good economic situation was inherited by anti-reform 
forces. This might have contributed to a slower accumulation of market reforms. 
 
  All  the  previous  remarks  on  institutional  dynamics  disregarded  the  role  of  the 
individual, which to some extent is a chance factor. However, any serious account of deeper 
institutional change must include this factor. Differences in the personalities of the occupants 
of the top positions matter. An analysis of deeper institutional change that omits this variable 
is  like  an  analysis  of  the  war  that  disregards  differences  in  the  quality  of  the  opposing 
commanders. 
  Individuals that played key roles in the expansion of radical statism include Lenin, 
Mao,  and  Castro.  Among  individuals  on  the  opposite  side  one  should  name  Gorbachev, 
Wałęsa, Reagan, Thatcher, and Deng. 
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  Let me finish on a normative note: the forces of statism will always exist.  In order to 
prevent their triumph – that is, their reversing of some of their market reforms or blockage of  
some  necessary  ones  -  the  proponents  of  a  limited  state,  of  free  economy  and  of  free 
society,  have  to  be  well-organized  and  efficient,  both  in  research  and  in  mass 
communication. Systematic intellectual work and organizational preparation is needed to be 
able to move fast on specific reforms whenever an opportunity appears. An important role 
can and should be played by strong, independent think tanks. However, research on reforms, 
though necessary, is not enough: professional, systematic mass communication is needed to 
neutralize statist doctrines and clichés and to unmask the statist interests. This appears to 
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